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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early twenty-first century, the network neutrality debate has
been a heated discussion concerning the amount of control (network
management) that network operators and service providers have over the
traffic of content on their network. This debate is particularly pressing in
light of the development of next-generation broadband infrastructures. The
academic network neutrality discourse has taken place mainly in the United
States. Recently, however, the debate on network neutrality has gained
traction among European academics and regulators as well.
There are clear differences between the U.S. and European telecom
markets and the regulation thereof. Most clearly, Europe comes from a
tradition of state monopolies; whereas, U.S. telecommunications operators
have almost always been private enterprises. Late 2008 and early 2009
have witnessed development in telecommunications policy and the network
neutrality dispute on both sides of the Atlantic. The FCC made its landmark
decision in the Comcast case.' The Obama Administration is currently
formulating its telecommunications policies. The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act's (Recovery Act) Broadband Technology Opportunities
Program (BTOP) underscores the Administration's dedication to
incentivizing development of "neutral" broadband networks throughout the
United States.2 At the same time, European regulators are reviewing their
regulatory framework for telecommunications, which consists of an
elaborate set of laws applicable to all EU member states. European
lawmakers are also in the process of developing a strategy of fostering
broadband, deployment under a comprehensible network-management
regime.3 In fact, the New York Times reports that European
telecommunications reform has drawn considerable interest from U.S.
1. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008).
2. See 47 U.S.C. § 13050) (2009) (requiring adherence to 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005)
for grants under the Act).
3. See PARL Ea. Doc. (SEC 2007) 1472, at 90-102 [hereinafter "Impact
Assesment"].
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lobbyists for the telecommunications industry.4 It would thus be a
worthwhile endeavor to critically compare the regulatory actions of both
the European Institutions and the U.S. Congress and FCC concerning
network management and broadband deployment.5
The present Article offers a critical review of U.S. and European
telecommunications policy in relation to network neutrality and network
management and investigates which aspects of European broadband policy
may be worth emulating in the United States. In an attempt to minimize
regulatory errors, European regulators in telecommunications have
developed an analytical legal mechanism in which antitrust and sector-
specific regulation interact.6 This mechanism allows for close monitoring
of markets under antitrust law and permits regulation in case of
demonstrated market failure. This regulatory mechanism is slated to be
lifted when the regulated market becomes competitive again.
However well developed this European system may be, there are
many relevant points for criticism. European lawmakers struggle with
network neutrality, and weak compromises have arisen out of conflicts
between European regulatory bodies. These compromises led to a wait-
and-see stance toward network neutrality. This Article will argue that such
a wait-and-see policy is not the optimal approach when considering that
broadband is a complex emerging market. Rather, a more dynamic policy
that balances investment incentives and externalities in next-generation
broadband is recommended.7 The European willingness to compromise
provides an opportunity for U.S. regulators to develop a policy that broadly
follows the European legal framework, but is better developed in terms of
network neutrality issues. As the FCC is required to produce a national
4. Kevin J. O'Brien, U.S. Lobbyists Angle for Influence in Europe's Net Neutrality
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/
technology/08iht-neutral. 1.20669185.html.
5. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Governing Networks:
Telecommunication Deregulation in Europe and the United States, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
819 (2002) (providing comparative studies on European and American telecommunications
policy); Amit M. Schejter, 'From All M Teachers I Have Grown Wise, and from y
Students More than Anyone Else': What Lessons Can the US Learn from Broadband
Policies in Europe? 71 INT'L COMM. GAZETTE 429 (2009). See also Rebecca Wong &
Daniel B. Garrie, Network Neutrality: Laissez-Faire Approach or Not?, 34 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 315 (2008) (offering a specific and comparative study on network
neutrality in the EU and United States).
6. See generally Damien Geradin & Michel Kerf, Controlling Market Power in
Telecommunications: Antitrust vs Sector-specific Regulation (2008).
7. See Pietro Crocioni, Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging Markets: A Review
of Cases, Literature, and a Suggested Framework, 4 J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 449, 512
(2008).
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broadband plan under the Recovery Act, 8 it has ample opportunity to
develop such a dynamic strategy to further broadband deployment
throughout the United States.
The structure of this Article is as follows: Section I will provide a
short background on the network neutrality debate by examining its
technical, legal, and economic context. To further demonstrate the
complexity of developing a comprehensive network neutrality policy, this
Article defines particulars of the emerging broadband market. Section II
will examine U.S. and European telecommunications policies. This
Article's analysis of U.S. telecommunications policy will focus on the most
recent events in network neutrality and network management-the
Comcast case, the Recovery Act, and the FCC's Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. This Article will then discuss how Congress and the FCC
have progressively deregulated the telecommunications sector and how
recent developments may signal a reversal of those deregulatory
tendencies.
The background of European telecommunications policy will be
discussed in order to show how the interaction between sector-specific
regulation and antitrust has developed in the EU. Pan-European policy was
implemented to allow for an internal, competitive European
telecommunications market, which would fuel innovation, increase
diversity and quality, and lower prices. This policy has largely been
successful. The current review process of the European regulatory
framework has attempted to address network neutrality concerns. Closer
analysis demonstrates this preliminary European network neutrality policy
to be too cautious, and practical problems may arise.
However, Section III argues that, notwithstanding these practical
problems, the European framework potentially offers an optimal approach
for dealing with network neutrality issues and fosters development of next-
generation broadband networks. This argument finds support in U.S. and
European telecommunications policies that relate to regulatory error costs.
Analysis shows that, in an emerging market, such as next-generation
broadband, not only are errors more likely to occur, but they also carry
larger costs than in "regular" markets.9
Through an analytical model, this Article will demonstrate that the
European interaction of antitrust and regulation in telecommunications
evades two common errors: false negatives and false positives.' 0 In the
8. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115(2009).
9. Crocioni, supra note 7, at 451.
10. For an explanation of false positives and false negatives in law, see R.S. Radford,
Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two Errors and the Law, 21 Loy.
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former, no regulation is imposed if antitrust law falls short; while in the
latter, unnecessary regulation is implemented on an otherwise competitive
market. Academics have debated whether false positives or false negatives
bear the largest cost to society and on which of these errors regulatory
intervention should focus. By building on existing models, this Article
demonstrates that costs of both errors are not as easily offset as often
assumed. This invalidates elemental trade offs between the two errors,
which are especially pertinent in emerging markets. Emerging markets,
such as broadband, do not fare well with categorical intervention against
false-negative or false-positive errors. In order to maximize responsible
broadband deployment, this Article argues for a flexible and dynamic
network neutrality policy that pivots between fighting false positives and
false negatives when necessary. The contours of such a flexible regulatory
mechanism are present in the European framework for telecommunications,
and a similar mechanism could be used in dealing with network neutrality
issues in the United States.
This Article thus recommends that U.S. lawmakers emulate the
European dynamic interaction between antitrust and sector-specific
regulation, while omitting dubious European policy decisions concerning
network management. Practical scenarios for reform are suggested, such as
allowing the FCC to monitor competition in broadband networks more
closely. With a National Broadband Plan due in February 2010, the FCC
should put effort into advancing these reform scenarios and take the
opportunity to monitor competition more closely in broadband markets.
This Article is intended to offer critical insight into the European
telecommunications policy to benefit U.S. policymakers and academics.
II. SOME NOTES ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY, NETWORK
MANAGEMENT, AND EMERGING BROADBAND MARKETS
Since the term was coined by Tim Wu in 2003," a heated
interdisciplinary debate has evolved on network neutrality.12 At the core of
L.A. L. REv. 843 (1988); Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation:
Competition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMoRY L.J. 1401 (2003).
11. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
12. See Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. CoMm. L.J. 575 (2006) (providing an overview of the U.S.
legal debate); see generally Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A 'Third Way' on
Network Neutrality (Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-=-1004522; David
D. Clark, Network Neutrality: Words of Power and 800-pound Gorillas, 1 INT'L J. COMM.
701 (2007); Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871 (2009);
Jon Crowcroft, Net Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate - A White Paper, 1 INT'L J.
COMM. 567 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?-Handicapping the Odds for
a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2006); Brett M.
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the debate lies the question whether or not all content and service providers
on the Internet should be treated equally by the network operators on
whose networks they operate. This, in essence, is a principle of network
architecture: the Internet was designed to treat all data packets sent between
nodes on the network equally without discriminating between packets. In
times of network congestion-too many packets going through a router at
once-packets simply would "wait in line." As a consequence, most
control of Internet traffic is located at the network's ends-its users. Users
initiate packet traffic, and the network itself is a passive conduit. 3 While
this so-called end-to-end principle is the result of technological
Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an
Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS 383 (2007); C. Scott
Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25 YALE J.
ON REG. 135 (2008); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Product-
Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate, 19 INFO. ECON. &
POL'Y 215 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925
(2001); Robert E. Litan & Hal J. Singer, Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (2006); Moran Yemini, Mandated
Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from Turner and a New Approach,
13 VA. J.L. TECH. 1 (2008); Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, "Justice and Only Justice,
You Shall Pursue ": Network Neutrality, the First Amendment, and John Rawls 's Theory of
Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMMM. TECH. L. REv. 137 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-
Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 349 (2006) (providing an overview of economic studies on network neutrality);
Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 329 (2007) [hereinafter "Towards an
Economic Framework"]; Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60
ADMIN. L. REv. 273 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARv. J.L.
& TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006) [hereinafter "Economics of Congestion"]; Jay Pil
Choi & Byung-Cheol Kim, Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives (CESifo Working
Paper No. 2390, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1264934; Nicholas
Economides & Joacim Tig, Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market Analysis
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-40, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1019121; Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and
Innovation (U. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-23, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1262845 [hereinafter "Network Neutrality, Consumers, and
Innovation"]; Hsing Kenneth Cheng, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay & Hong Guo, The Debate
on Net Neutrality: A Policy Perspective (forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=959944; Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality,
available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf (giving an overview of the
network neutrality debate in network engineering); Mark A. Jamison & Janice A. Hauge,
Getting What You Pay for: Analyzing the Net Neutrality Debate (Working Paper, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/paper= 1081690.
13. David Isenberg, then at AT&T, in 1997 famously referred to the Internet as "dumb"
in this matter. David Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid Network, COMPUTER TELEPHONY 16 (Aug.
1997): see also Rise of the Stupid Network, http://isen.com/stupid.htm (Author provides
links to article published on various Web sites.) (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
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developments in the initial stages of the Internet, 4 it arguably also stems, to
some extent, from early policy decisions by the FCC.' 5 Only the edges of
the Internet were determined to be truly free from regulation by the FCC;
hence, it was logical for innovation to take place there. In any case, the
end-to-end principle has been defining the architecture of the Internet, and
arguably constitutes the innovative character of the emergent Internet
economy. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) reports that
Ebay, Yahoo, Google and Amazon were able to enter their respective
markets on a scale that was not possible before the Internet. The
Internet has reduced barriers to large-scale market entry in many
consumer markets and this has increased competition and consumer
welfare across sectors. Now, some commentators are worried that a
multi-tiered structure would introduce a new barrier to entry and stifle
innovation at the edges. 6
Indeed, the end-to-end principle found its origins in the age of
narrowband Internet, where most data packets are of approximately the
same "weight" and timely delivery is not a necessity. 17 The growth of
broadband deployment, however, led to an increase in demand for high-
bandwidth applications and services like streaming video, which is
sensitive to delay.' 8 It is argued, therefore, that absolute end-to-end
connectivity may no longer be the most ideal principle for network
architecture in the era of broadband, since unconditional end-to-end routing
does not allow for distinguished handling of packets that require specific
treatment.' 9 This would urge for a closer inspection of data traffic, which
would create a more active network. Reasonable network management may
be required to facilitate functional Internet usage on congested broadband
14. See Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, The New Network Neutrality:
Criteria for Internet Freedom, 12 INT'L J. CoMM. L. & POL'Y 225, 236 (2008); see generally
J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed & D. D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER Sys. 277 (1984) (the seminal technical paper on end-to-end).
15. Particularly of interest here is the FCC's distinction between "basic" and
"enhanced" services as specified in Computer Inquiry 11, which left the "enhanced" services
unregulated. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417-29 (May 2, 1980). This
eventually resulted in the separation of "telecommunications" and "information" services in
the 1996 Telecommunications Act. See generally Joshua L. Mindel & Marvin A. Sirbu,
Regulatory Treatment of IP Transport and Services, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN
TRANSITION: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 59-64 (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane
Greenstein ed., 2001).
16. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Working Party on Telecomm. and Info.
Servs. Policies, Internet Traffic Prioritisation: An Overview 17 (Apr. 6, 2007).
17. See Christopher Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or
Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 23, 30-34 (2004).
18. See, e.g., Crowcroft, supra note 12, at 574.
19. Id.
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networks. In order to offer streamlined high-performance applications and
services, it may be necessary to distinguish between packets of high and
low priority, 20 and allocate bandwidth more actively in case of congestion.
However, allowing (deep) packet inspection and treatment based on that
inspection can be much more far reaching than simple network
management. Packet inspection for network-management purposes can be
easily expanded to increase control over Internet traffic for economic or
moral reasons, and violate competition on markets and civil liberties. 2'
Indeed, the recent past has demonstrated that network operators have
practiced unreasonable and disproportionate network management.22 Thus,
a policy is needed to determine which forms of management are allowed on
networks and which are not. A balance should be struck that allows the
Internet to remain open while allowing network-management measures that
ensure maximum quality of service (QoS). 23 This Article does not draw a
binary opposition between network neutrality and network management,
but places network neutrality on a continuum between reasonable and
unreasonable network management.
A supposed optimal ratio between reasonable and unreasonable
network management becomes more pertinent in relation to deployment of
next-generation broadband infrastructures. Confronted with "digital
divides" in knowledge economies, governments wish to push broadband
deployment24 in a largely deregulated telecommunications landscape.
Governments want to incentivize network operators to roll out next-
generation broadband infrastructures in previously underserved areas,
preferably to develop these areas into a competitive broadband market.25
20. See Felten, supra note 12, at 2-3; Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating
Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT'L J. CoMM. 644, 644-659
(2007).
21. See generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1417, 1490 (2009) (discussing the relation between deep packet inspection and
network neutrality); see also Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and its Impact on the
Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power between Intellectual Property
Creators and Consumers (Working Paper, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/ abstract=995273.
22. See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
October 19, 2007.
23. For a more precise explanation of this balance, see JONATHAN ZrTTRAIN, T14E
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET: AND How TO STOP IT (2008).
24. Compare Lennard G. Kruger & Angele A. Gilroy, Broadband Internet Access and
the Digital Divide: Federal Assistance Programs, CRS Report for Congress (Mar. 19, 2009)
(discussing the U.S. digital divide), with European Commission Communication on
Bridging the Broadband Gap, at 7-8, COM (2006) 129 final (discussing the European digital
divide).
25. See, e.g, Eur. Comm'n on Competition, Public consultations: Broadband Guidelines
on the application EU state aid rules to public funding of broadband networks, (May 19,
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_
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These next-generation network operators, however, wish to recoup the
tremendous fixed costs that come with infrastructure deployment through
increased dominance over their own networks. As in any network industry,
next-generation broadband networks are prone to network effects and
falling into natural monopoly.26 Telecommunications regulators are thus
confronted with possibly conflicting policy goals of increasing broadband
deployment and desiring competitive and nondiscriminatory usage of those
networks.27
At the same time, next-generation broadband is an emerging market,
in which any regulatory intervention (or lack thereof), necessary or
otherwise, can have a tremendous impact on the state of the market.28
Emerging markets in general can be defined as having "a significant
(above-average) degree of uncertainty about the evolution of future
demand., 29 More specifically, there are additional features that possibly
can characterize emerging markets: first, emerging markets may be highly
dependent on investment for dynamic efficiency; and, second, such markets
may be more prone to the competitive harm of externalities such as
network effects and switching costs. 30  These possible, additional
characteristics of emerging markets do not necessarily apply to the same
extent: some emerging markets may be generally uncertain, but more
dependant on investment than vulnerable to externalities and vice versa.31
Intuitively, it seems plausible to assume that all aforementioned
possible characteristics of emerging markets apply for the market of next-
generation broadband infrastructures; naturally, there is great uncertainty
about future (bandwidth) demand in broadband, which is subject to intense
broadbandguidelines/ (advising European member states on incentivizing broadband
deployment without breaking European state-aid laws). For an English translation, see also
Community Guidelines for the Application of State Aid Rules in Relation to Rapid
Deployment of Broadband Networks, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
consultations/2009_broadband_guidelines/guidelines en.pdf.
26. For an overview of the basic economic principles of network industries and
broadband, see generally JONATHAN NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP WEISER, DIGITAL
CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 3-22, 134-
148 (2005). See also DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND LAW 348-355 (2009) (analyzing the role of
network effects in broadband networks).
27. See, e.g., Emst-Olav Ruhle & Wolfgang Reichl, Incentives for Investments in Next
Generation Access and Customer Choice: a Dichotomy?, 44 INTERECONOMICS 30, 30-40
(2009) (providing a detailed description of the trade-off between fostering broadband
deployment and a competitive broadband market).
28. Crocioni, supra note 7, at 502.
29. Id. at 497.
30. Id. at 498.
31. Id
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debate.32 Proponents of strict network neutrality regulation often stress the
strong network effects in broadband markets,33 while skeptics emphasize
the need to allow incumbents to recoup their investments to safeguard
innovation.34 The assumption that all parameters of emerging markets
apply to broadband, moreover, is echoed by a more or less neutral source-
the OECD.35
The desired balance between reasonable and unreasonable network
management thus is troubled by potentially incompatible policy goals and a
market of above-average uncertainty. Policy and regulation in network
management is, therefore, not to be taken lightly, and seems to require a
dynamic approach that pivots between the various difficulties of the
broadband marketplace.
The debate on the appropriateness and feasibility of network
management has taken place in the United States since the early twenty-
first century, but has only recently emerged in Europe. In what follows,
network neutrality shall be related to telecommunications policy in the
United States and Europe.
32. For a detailed description of relevant issues in assessing future broadband demand,
see Economics of Congestion, supra note 12, at 189-93. For the most conclusive research on
the topic, see MINTS- Minnesota Internet Traffic Studies
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/mints/home.php (last visited Dec. 10, 2009).
33. See, e.g., Towards an Economic Framework, supra note 12, at 329, 332.
34. See, e.g., Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, supra note 12.
35. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Broadband Growth and Policies in
OECD Countries: Ministerial Background Report (June 2008). The report stated the
following:
Broadband operators face uncertainty as to how to recoup their large investments
in the absence of new revenue-generating broadband services and content.
Content providers are waiting for improved connectivity and content protection.
These mutual uncertainties have the potential to slow down investment in higher-
speed broadband networks and the generation of new broadband services.
Id. at 96. The report later also announced, "OECD countries emphasise research and
innovation in the fields of broadband infrastructure (e.g. networks, connecting technologies,
system support products and testing), related applications (especially in the wireless area),
broadband-enabled public services, digital broadband content and even R&D focusing on
new broadband business models." Id. at 131. The OECD report also went into detail on the
importance of competitive markets:
Maintaining a level-playing field and reducing anti-competitive practices in the
face of high network effects and to promote consumer choice is crucial, i.e. in
particular considering the increased use of walled garden approaches, as well as
cross-industry mergers and acquisitions. With problems such as vertical
integration, lock-in of consumers in certain standards, and poor access to certain
content, an environment of contestable markets should be created where small and
innovative players can compete.
Id. at 15.
INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN APPROACH
III. EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PATHS TO PRESENT-DAY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
A. A Brief History of U.S. Network Management Regulation
1. "The Past Is a Foreign Country"
36
In the course of the U.S. academic debate on network management
and network neutrality, the history of U.S. telecommunications law has
been described at such length that it can almost be deemed common
knowledge.37 However, since the fall of 2008, there has been an increase in
development that has, so far, only sparsely been documented. 3 The Obama
Administration has signaled a clear break with previous policy, and is
currently in the process of revising regulatory oversight in
telecommunications. Therefore, this Section will mainly focus on the most
recent events in network-management policy, with special emphasis on the
Comcast case,39 the Recovery Act and the FCC's Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet.40
Many have remarked that telecommunications networks in the United
States have traditionally been regulated under common carrier
requirements. 41 All services falling under Title II of the 1934
Communications Act were required, ex ante, to offer their services for a
reasonable rate, at reasonable request, and without unreasonable price
discrimination. 2 These principles were more firmly established in the
consent decree between the Department of Justice, Western Electric, and
36. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 9 (1953).
37. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 12, at 886-923.
38. Compare David L. Sieradzld & Winston J. Maxwell, The FCC's Network Neutrality
Ruling in the Comcast Case. Towards a Consensus with Europe?, COMM. & STRATEGIES,
4th Quarter 2008, at 73-88, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfin?abstractid=1374314 (discussing analogies between the FCC's decision in Comcast
and European policy), with Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation (Univ. of
Colo. Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-02, 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1344757 (discussing the state of U.S.
telecommunications policy after the Comcast decision).
39. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra
note 1.
40. Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg.
63.638 (Oct. 22 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
41. See, e.g., Barbara Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common
Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. Ky. L. REv. 483 (2006);
Crawford, supra note 12, at 878-84.
42. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2006).
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AT&T,43 the three consecutive Computer Inquiries,44 and eventually the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which distinguished "information
services" (Title ) from "telecommunications services" (Title 11). 4 ' The
crucial difference between Titles I and II was that the latter covered mere
transmission of signals (without modifying content) and was subject to
46common carriage requirements.
The Supreme Court's decision in Brand X,4' and the subsequent
Wireline Broadband Order by the FCC,48 determined that both cable and
DSL Internet services were subject to regulation as Title I (information
services) under the Telecommunications Act, instead of under Title II. This
Title I authority exempts cable and DSL operators from common carrier
requirements under Title II; thus, network operators are not forbidden from
implementing network-management practices that would constitute
unreasonable discrimination under Title 11. 4 9 These actions marked a
departure from sector-specific regulation into broad, ex post enforcement,
which falls outside of the FCC's hands. Aware of this situation, the FCC
drafted a loosely formulated set of ex ante policy principles urging
reasonable and nondiscriminatory behavior by network operators. 50
43. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68, 246 (D.N.J. Jan.
24, 1956).
44. See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Commc'n Servs. & Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, para. 16-17 (1970);
modified by Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 21 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1591
(1971); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), supra note 15, at para. 1; Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the
Comm'n's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104
F.C.C.2d 958 (June 16, 1986), 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 603 (1986), modified by Amendment
of Sections 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry),
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987).
45. 47 U.S.C § 153 (2007).
46. See Crawford, supra note 12, at 896-98.
47. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996
(2005).
48. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005)
[Hereinafter "Wireline Broadband Order"].
49. Cf Crawford, supra note 12, at 907.
50. The policy principles are as follows:
To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet, [1] consumers are entitled to access
the lawful Internet content of their choice .... [2] consumers are entitled to run
applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law
enforcement .... [3] consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal
devices that do not harm the network. . . . [4] consumers are entitled to
competition among network providers, application and service providers, and
content providers.
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, para. 4 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
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2. Present Developments: Comcast and the Recovery Act
A fierce debate subsequently erupted as to whether or not the policy
principles were actually enforceable.5' This debate was triggered by the
infamous Comcast case, in which cable operator Comcast allegedly
blocked peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol traffic on its network, regardless of the
lawful or unlawful status of that P2P traffic. 52 The FCC eventually
determined that it had the jurisdictional authority under Title I of the
Communications Act to disapprove of Comcast's discriminatory
practices.53 Comcast decided to bring a lawsuit contesting the FCC's
reasoning, which at the moment of writing is still pending in the D.C.
Circuit.
54
The Comcast case is remarkable in that the very same FCC
administration that was the force behind Brand X-which effectively
deregulated pressing ex ante provisions on broadband networks55-seemed
to have had a change of heart and determined that an arguably rhetorical set
of policy principles that would undercut Brand X was enforceable on an ex
ante basis after all. In the end, the FCC's deregulatory approach, which was
forcefully endorsed with Brand X, is under debate again,56 and might well
tilt back towards sector-specific, ex ante regulation of broadband networks.
This has become more likely with a new administration in office.
51. Compare Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, Petition to
Establish Rules Governing Network Management Practices by Broadband Network
Operators of Vuze, Inc. (2007) (urging the FCC to codify more strongly and subsequently
enforce the Policy Principles against alleged unreasonable network management), and
Comment Sought on Petition for Rulemaking to Establish Rules Governing Network
Management Practices by Broadband Network Operators., Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R 343
(January 14, 2008) (FCC opens formal comment process on the enforceability of the Policy
Principles), with Comments of Hands Off the Internet, FCC WC Docket No. 07-52
(received Feb. 13, 2008).
52. See Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Oct. 19, 2007) (discussing the Formal Compl. of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against
Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer App'ns, Nov. 1, 2007).
53. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra
note 1.
54. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2008).
55. For an apt observation of the FCC's deregulatory agenda, see Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Nat ' Cable & Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand Xlnternet Servs.: "Actually,
in these cases, it might be more accurate to say the Commission has attempted to establish a
whole new regime of non-regulation, which will make for more or less free-market
competition, depending upon whose experts are believed." 545 U.S. 967, 1005 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
56. See, e.g. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast
Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
supra note 1, FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet, supra
note 40.
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On the campaign trail, then-Democratic presidential candidate Barack
Obama stated that he would take "a back seat to no one in [his]
commitment to network neutrality."57  As president, Obama has
underscored his commitment to network neutrality and broadband
deployment in the Recovery Act.58  The much-contested American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act59 was drafted in response to the financial
crisis of fall 2008 as an attempt to jump start the U.S. economy by boosting
federal spending. The Recovery Act provides funding opportunities for a
plethora of infrastructure projects, including deployment of broadband
infrastructure in rural and underserved areas.6 ° Part of the broadband
stimulus money attempts to strengthen the existing Rural Utilities
Service,6' which is of little interest to this Article. More interesting is the
BTOP Program.62
The aims of the BTOP include providing and improving broadband
access in underserved areas; providing broadband education and training to
educational institutions, libraries, community support organizations, and
outreach organizations that assist low-income, aged, unemployed, or
otherwise "vulnerable populations"; improving use of broadband service by
public-safety agencies; and stimulating economic growth.63 The BTOP is to
be administered jointly by the FCC and the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA). 64 Applicants can apply for a grant
to pursue the above-mentioned goals and, in doing so, will be subject to
contractual conditions of nondiscrimination as well as interconnection
requirements.65 These requirements, crucially, will at least consist of the
four principles of the FCC's Policy Statement.66 Therefore, for all new
broadband infrastructure developed under the BTOP, the Policy Statement
will apply as a bottom line on an ex ante basis. This seems to imply that
57. Barack Obama: On Net Neutrality (Nov. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g-mWlqccn8k (replaying a speech before Google
employees in Mountain View, Calif., Nov. 2007).
58. Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). Congress has followed suit
by reintroducing a network neutrality bill. See Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009,
H.R. 3458, 111 th Cong. (2009).
59. Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
60. For a helpful guide through the broadband related parts of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act, see S. Derek Turner, Putting the Angels in the Details: A Roadmap
for Broadband Stimulus Success (2009), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/
Angels in the Details.pdf.
61. 7 C.F.R. § 1738.1-1739 (2007).
62. Recovery Act, Title VI § 6001.
63. Id. at § 6001(b).
64. Id. at § 6001.
65. Id.
66. Id. at § 60010); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, supra note 50, at para. 4.
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network operators will have to give equal access to all content and service
providers operating on their network, so that end users have access to "the
lawful Internet content of their choice."
67
Besides these obligations for applicants, the BTOP also requires the
FCC to submit a "national broadband plan" to the appropriate House and
Senate committees within a year of enactment of the Recovery Act.68 The
ambitious goal of this plan is to "seek to ensure that all people of the
United States have access to broadband capability and shall establish
benchmarks for meeting that goal.'69 Moreover, the Act prescribes that the
FCC analyze the most effective and efficient way to achieve this goal,
strive for affordability of the offered broadband services, and continue to
monitor actual broadband deployment under the BTOP.7°
Moreover, the FCC instantiated by the Obama Administration has
initiated a formal rulemaking process with the intent to formally codify a
rewritten version of the Policy Statement.71 The proposed rules add two
additional principles of non-discrimination7 2 and transparency, 73 while
explicitly making the by-now six policy principles subject to "reasonable
network management., 74 While the rulemaking process is still in its early
67. Id. at para. 4.
68. Recovery Act § 6001(k)(1).
69. Id. at § 6001(k)(2).
70. Id. at § 6001(k)(2)(A)-(C).
71. See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet, supra
note 40. For Policy Statement, see supra note 50.
72. See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Draft Proposed Rules for Public Input,
§8.13, supra note 40: "[A] provider of broadband Internet access service must treat lawful
content, applications, and services in a nondiscriminatory manner."Id.
73. Id. at §8.14: "[A] provider of broadband Internet access service must disclose such
information concerning network management and other practices as is reasonably required
for users and content, application, and service providers to enjoy the protections specified in
this part."Id.
74. Id. at §8.3:
Reasonable network management consists of:
(a) reasonable practices employed by a provider of broadband Internet access
service to:
(i) reduce or mitigate the effects of congestion on its network or to address
quality-of-service concerns;
(ii) address traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful;
(iii) prevent the transfer of unlawful content; or
(iv) prevent the unlawful transfer of content; and
(b) other reasonable network management practices.
The FCC motivates the catch-all category under (b) as follows:
First, we do not presume to know now everything that providers may need to do to
provide robust, safe, and secure Internet access to their subscribers, much less
everything they may need to do as technologies and usage patterns change in the
future. Second, we believe that additional flexibility to engage in reasonable
network management provides network operators with an important tool to
experiment and innovate as user needs change.
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stages, it seems that much of the effectiveness of the proposed rules and the
FCC's clout in enforcing these will depend on how "reasonable network
management" will be further defined as the drafting process develops. In
any event, the FCC's proposal to formally codify the extended Policy
Principles suggests that the FCC is intent to preempt the outcome of
Comcast v. FCC5 on the enforceability of the original Policy Statement,
and increase regulatory oversight on the broadband market.
The policy shifts in broadband during and in between the present and
past administrations suggest a trial-and-error policy between categorical
approaches, subject to a high degree of institutional learning.76 After a
tradition of common carriage in telecommunications, broadband was
heavily deregulated-supposedly to stimulate incumbents' investment into
broadband infrastructure deployment.7 7 With U.S. broadband deployment
lagging behind other developed countries78 and a new administration in
office, emphasis has shifted again to increased regulation, as evidenced by
the BTOP and the FCC's Proposed Rulemaking. Without speaking out in
favor of either of these policies, it seems reasonable to state that any
categorical approach refutes the status of broadband as a complex and
uncertain market. As will be described in Section III of this Article, an
optimal broadband policy allows regulation to pivot between spurring
investment and dealing with externalities in a systematic and flexible
mechanism.
Even though the BTOP is administered by the NTIA and FCC,
drafting the broadband plan offers the FCC unprecedented authority to
outline policy for broadband deployment, including a detailed policy on
network neutrality. Network-management policy in broadband markets is a
daunting endeavor because of the potentially conflicting policy goals of
incentivizing infrastructure investment and developing a competitive
market-all of which happens in an environment of above-average
uncertainty. The FCC has a rare opportunity to pursue such a daunting
See FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 40, at
§ 140
75. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2008).
76. See Johannes M. Bauer & Erik Bohlin, From Static to Dynamic Regulation: Recent
Developments in US Telecommunications Policy, 43 INTERECONOMICS 38, 50 (2008).
77. See FCC Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 48, at §3:
We are confident that the regulatory regime we adopt in this Order will promote
the availability of competitive broadband Internet access services to consumers,
via multiple platforms, while ensuring adequate incentives are in place to
encourage the deployment and innovation of broadband platforms consistent with
our obligations and mandates under the [Telecommunications] Act. Id.
78. For a detailed report on decreasing growth in U.S. broadband deployment, see, for
example, S. Derek Turner, America's Broadband Reality Check II: The Truth Behind
America's Digital Decline (2006), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/bbrc2-
final.pdf.
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strategy and develop a comprehensive network-management policy in the
United States. With this opportunity comes a great responsibility, which
requires the FCC to be systematic yet flexible and, above all, transparent in
drafting and implementing its national broadband plan.79
Section III of this Article will offer recommendations on how to
develop a comprehensive network-management policy based on analytical
research and European precedent. European telecommunications regulation
will be dealt with at length, since little research has been conducted on EU
telecommunications policy from a U.S. perspective, and only scarce
literature is available on how EU telecommunications regulation relates to
issues in network neutrality and next-generation broadband deployment.
B. European Telecommunications Regulation and Network
Management
1. The Long Road to Open Markets
The European telecommunications market traditionally consisted of a
series of national monopolies held by incumbent state-owned operators.80
By the late 1980s, the European Commission proposed a two-way strategy,
which included (1) liberalizing and privatizing the telecommunication
markets of individual member states and (2) creating a harmonized
European internal marketplace for telecommunications.8 ' What followed
was a deregulation of the sector, which allowed for further convergence of
media and telecommunications and effective competition. 2
Thus, the European Commission drafted a completely new regulatory
framework that was designed according to five main principles.8 3 The
79. Initial reports indicate that the FCC is taking this role very seriously, as evidenced
by the new Web portal, which includes a countdown timer. Welcome to Broadband.gov,
http://www.broadband.gov.
80. See, e.g. Christian Koenig, Andreas Bartosch, Jens-Daniel Braun, EC Competition
and Telecommunications Law 51 (Kluwer Law International 2002).
81. A 1988 directive introducing competition in national telecom markets was the first
directive pursuant of this dual strategy and, with that, the very first European Economic
Community telecommunications law. See 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73-77.
82. See Commission Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications,
Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation, COM
(1997) 623 (Dec. 3, 1997).
83. Id. These five principles are the following:
(1) Regulation should be limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve clearly
identified objectives .... (2) Future regulatory approaches should respond to the
needs of users .... (3) Regulatory decisions should be guided by a need for a clear
and predictable framework .... (4) Ensuring full participation in a converged
environment. . . . (5) Independent and effective regulators will be central to a
converging environment.
Id. at 33.
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framework contained three legal instruments-antitrust law, binding
sector-specific regulation, and additional nonbinding sector-specific
measures, 84 which were implemented in six directives.8 5 This regulatory
framework eventually was enacted in 2002, and has been under review
since 2007.86
The 2002 framework, in its broadest terms, can be characterized by
three foundational strategies, of which the first two are closely related: (1)
deregulation through decreasing ex ante regulation, (2) new regulation
premised on the existence of significant market power (SMP), and (3) the
principle of technological neutrality.8 7 The strategies of decreased ex ante
regulation and SMP identification, especially, testify to the general market-
based approach that the European Commission has adopted for
telecommunications policy.8 8 This market-oriented strategy has proven
generally to be successful in many EU countries, where competition
84. Antitrust law, naturally, was already in force outside of telecommunication-specific
regulation, and it is not by coincidence that the framework has been built on top of forty
years of jurisdiction in European antitrust law; this would underscore the general
deregulatory and market-based approach in the new framework. See Alexandre de Streel,
The Integration of Competition Law Principles in the New European Regulatory
Framework for Electronic Communications, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 489, 489-514 (2003);
see also PIERRE LAROUCHE, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN EUROPEAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2000) (providing a detailed explanation of European Union antitrust
law in relation to telecommunications).
85. For a helpful scheme illustrating how directives coalesce, see Communication from
the Commission Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure
and Associated Services, at 18 COM (1999) 539 final. The overarching Framework
Directive outlines the relationship between the whole framework and National Regulatory
Authorities (NRAs) and balances the four underlying directives. See Council Framework
Directive 2002/21/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33 [hereinafter "Framework Directive"];
see Council Access Directive 2002/19/EC, art. 95, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 7 [hereinafter "Access
Directive"] (concerning interconnection and accessibility of communication networks); see
Council Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 21 [hereinafter
"Authorisation Directive"] (codifying licensing and resource management); see Council
Directive 2002/22/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51 [hereinafter "Universal Service
Directive"] (ensuring universal access and consumer rights); see Council Directive
2002/58/EC, art. 251, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 [hereinafter "ePrivacy Directive"] (protecting
privacy rights).
86. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission proposes a single European
Telecoms Market for 500 million consumers (Nov. 13. 2007) available at
http://europa.eu/rapidlpressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1677&format=PDF&aged
=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
87. See Joshua Mindel & Douglas Sicker, Leveraging the EU Regulatory Framework to
Improve a Layered Policy Model for US Telecommunications Markets, 30 TELECOMM. P'CY
136, 137 (2006).
88. This latter parameter of technological neutrality will not be discussed at length in
the present Article. For a detailed study on the matter, see ILSE MARTHE VAN DER HAAR, THE
PRINCIPLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY: CONNECTING EC NETWORK AND CONTENT
REGULATION (2008).
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between numerous operators has lead to lower prices and an increase in
both the number and speed of broadband connections.
89
The general premise behind the 2002 framework was that, in order to
build and sustain a competitive telecom market in the EU, as much
regulation as possible should be replaced by ex post application of antitrust
law.90 Only when markets are considered insufficiently competitive is
sector-specific regulation justified-and only until these markets become
sufficiently competitive. 91 The Framework Directive requires the European
Commission to draft a recommendation with and for Member States'
independent NRAs.92 This recommendation is supposed to support a
process of market analysis by NRAs to determine whether or not, in
eligible markets,93 firms enjoy SMP. 94 If market power is detected, NRAs
are directed to Article 8.2 of the Access Directive, which enables the NRA
to impose measures as diverse as obligatory transparency, 95
89. See, for instance, the OECD historical broadband penetration rates in countries like
Finland and the Netherlands. OECD Broadband Portal, http://oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband; see
also OECD, BROADBAND GROWTH AND POLICIES IN OECD CouNTRmIEs 24 (2008).
90. Cf Framework Directive, supra note 85, at para. 27 ("It is essential that ex ante
regulatory obligations should only be imposed where there is not effective competition, i.e.
in markets where there are one or more undertakings with significant market power, and
where national and Community competition law remedies are not sufficient to address the
problem.").
91. See, e.g., Comm'n Recommendation 2003 O.J. (L 114) 45,45-47.
92. The independence of NRA's from governments is established in the Framework
Directive. Framework Directive, supra note 85, at para. 11.
93. The European Commission generally favors the regulation of wholesale markets
over retail markets because the latter's level of competition is deemed to be mainly
dependent on the competitiveness of the former market. See Framework Directive, supra
note 85, at para. 26.
94. See Framework Directive, supra note 85, at arts. 15.1, 16.4. See also 2003 O.J. (L
114) 45, supra note 91, at para. 16. This explanatory memorandum accompanying the
recommendation offers a three-fold, cumulative scale to be used when assessing supposed
SMP in telecom markets. First, it is to be identified whether a particular market is subject to
"high and non-transitory entry barriers" for market entrants. Id. at para. 9. These barriers
occur when incumbent operators impose asymmetrical conditions amongst market entrants
on their network, or when required interconnection to complete a service is being hindered.
The second-much less clearly defined-criterion is whether the market under suspicion is
dynamic in such a way that it independently will tend toward effective competition over
time. Id. This condition would apply in cases of fluctuating market shares and a high level
of innovation-both characteristics of developing markets. The final criterion questions
whether antitrust is sufficient to deal with the first two criteria. Id. After all, ex-ante
regulation is only supposed to complement existing antitrust law.
95. See Access Directive, supra note 85, art. 9.
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nondiscrimination,96 accounting separation,97 open access,98 and price
control.99
Thus, the 2002 framework operates through an elaborate mechanism
of SMP identification to determine whether a specific market should be
subject to sector-specific regulation. Only then are the framework's
strongest tools for regulatory intervention enforceable, and only until the
market in question becomes competitive again. One of the provisions of the
framework requires that the functioning of individual Directives be
reviewed periodically, ensuring that regulation keeps up with technological
development.'00
2. European Telecoms Under Review
As technological progress and convergence have proceeded, the
European Commission has signaled the need to update the regulatory
framework in its entirety,' 0 stating that the European telecom market is
still too fragmented to represent an internal, open marketplace. 10 2 The
proposed new framework is a significant revision of the 2002 original. Its
direction could be interpreted as somewhat double sided because it grants
more independent regulatory power to NRAs while, at the same time,
attempting to strengthen the European Commission's authority.10 3
96. Id. at art. 10.
97. Id. at art. 13.
98. Id. at art. 12.
99. Id. at art. 13.
100. See Framework Directive, supra note 85, art. 25. For the European Commission's
latest review of the Framework Directive, based on public consultation, see Commission
Communication on the Review of EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Comm.
Networks and Servs., at 3, COM (2006) 334 final [hereinafter "Review of EU Regulatory
Framework"].
101. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Comm. Networks and Services, COM (2007) 697 final; Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal
Serv. and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, COM (2007) 698 final.
102. See European Commission Information Society, Reforming the Current Telecom
Rules, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/
index en.htm.
103. While the European Commission intends to grant NRAs more authority to enforce
structural separation of telecommunications operators, it has also proposed to let the
European Commission have veto power in NRA's market definition. Further, the European
Commission wants to introduce a pan-European telecommunications regulator. See Impact
Assessment, Commission Staff Working Document, PARL. EUR. Doc. (SEC 2007) 1472.
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What followed by the end of 2008 was back-and-forth °4 legislative
drafting between the European Parliament,0 5 the European Commission,' °6
the European Council, 10 7  and again the European Parliament.1
08
Disagreement among the three legislative branches concentrated on the
possible codification of veto power for the European Commission, the
enforcement of functional separation as a regulatory tool, and the
legitimacy of the pan-European telecommunications regulator. However, a
discussion on network neutrality led to unusual bickering between the
European Parliament and Council. A row between the two institutions
brought the negotiations process to conciliation committee, postponing
adoption of the new telecommunications package until late 2009.109 The
next Section shall address how the new European regulatory framework
relates to network neutrality, and how network neutrality became a divisive
issue in the drafting process of the new framework.
104. There are a great variety of legislative procedures in the EU, drawing on different
power relations between Commission, Council, and Parliament. Drafting a new
telecommunications framework goes according to the so-called "co-decision procedure,"
which is arguably the most transparent and democratic procedure available. See PAUL CRAIG
& GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS, 109-118 (4th ed. 2008).
105. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament on a Common Regulatory
Framework for Electronic Comm. Networks and Servs., COM (2007) 697 (Nov. 13, 2007);
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on
Universal Serv. and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, COM (2007)
698 final (Nov. 13, 2007).
106. See Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament Amending
Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Comm.
Networks and Servs., COM (2008) 724 final (Nov. 6, 2008); Amended Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2002/22/EC
on Universal Serv. and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, COM (2008)
723 final (Nov. 6, 2008).
107. See Council Common Position (EC) No. 16496/2008 of 9 Feb. 2009, art. 251;
Council Common Position (EC) No. 16497/2008 of 9 Feb. 2009. art. 25 1.
108. See Recommendation for Second Reading on the Council Common Position for
Adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives
2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Comm. Networks and
Servs., PARL. EuR. Doc. A6-0272 (SEC 2009) [hereinafter "PARL. Eul. Doc. A6-0272"];
Recommendation for Second Reading on the Council Common Position for Adopting a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives 2002/22/EC
on Universal Serv. and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, PARE. EUR.
Doc. A6-0257 (SEC 2009).
109. As of November 5, 2009 there appears to be agreement between the European
Institutions about the new regulatory framework, although no definitive draft has been
released yet. See EurActiv.com, EU telecoms reform package agreed, available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/eu-telecoms-reform-package-agreed/article-
187064?Ref=RSS.
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3. Network Neutrality Under the New Framework
The European Commission has followed the discussion on network
neutrality in the United States closely and has attempted to develop a
policy that translates network neutrality issues to the European market.1
The European Commission has framed network neutrality explicitly in
relation to the development of next-generation broadband infrastructure. 1 '
This is very much in line with the overall market-based approach that the
European Commission has advocated in its past telecommunications
policies." 2 At the outset, the European Commission acknowledged the
delicacy of regulating next-generation infrastructures, specifically, the
complexity of balancing-under conditions of above-average uncertainty-
the potential conflict between incentivizing investment in broadband and
fostering competition. 13 Under these circumstances, a middle ground for
future policy is proposed by the European Commission that opts for neither
complete open access to next-generation networks, nor grants operators so-
called regulatory holidays on next-generation infrastructures. 114 Rather, the
European Commission intends to maintain and further develop the SMP
mechanism of the existing regulatory framework: antitrust law triggers
regulatory intervention in cases of demonstrated market failure, and all
110. In the European Commission's wake, European academics have focused their
studies on network neutrality. See generally Martin Cave & Pietro Crocioni, Does Europe
Need Network Neutrality Rules?, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 669 (2007); Filomena Chirico, Ilse van
der Haar & Pierre Larouche, Network Neutrality in the EU (TILEC Discussion Paper No.
DP2007-030, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1018326; Vikt6ria Kocsis & Paul
W. J. de BijI, Network Neutrality and the Nature of Competition Between Network
Operators, 4 INT'L EcON'S & ECON. POL'Y 159 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid--976882; Christopher T. Marsden, Net
Neutrality: the European Debate, J. INTERNET L., Aug. 2008, at 1, 7-16; Christopher T.
Marsden, Net Neutrality 'Lite': Regulatory Responses to Broadband Internet Discrimination
(2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1330747; Andrea Renda, I Own the Pipes, You
Call the Tune: The Net Neutrality Debate and its (Ir)relevance for Europe (2008), available
at http://shop.ceps.be/downfree.php?itemid=1755; Peggy Valcke, et al., Guardian Knight
or Hands Off: The European Response to Network Neutrality: Legal Considerations on
Electronic Communications Reform, 72 COMM. & STRATEGIES 89 (2008).
111. See Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 18-47.
112. Id. at39-42.
113. Id. at 27.
In policy terms, the issue is to strike a regulatory balance between, on the one
hand, allowing incentives for investors in new core and access networks - in
the face of considerable uncertainty over the evolution of demand for these
services - and, on the other hand, avoiding the immediate foreclosure of new
markets by sanctioning the reassertion of monopoly privileges by the dominant
market players over these new infrastructures. Id.
114. See id. at 46: "A combination of infrastructure competition and regulation seems to
produce the highest national broadband penetration rates."Id.
[Vol. 62
INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN APPROACH
intervention is lifted once markets become competitive again. 15 However,
given the strong network effects of next-generation infrastructures, NRAs
can, as a measure of last resort, functionally separate incumbent
companies.116
With this in mind, the European Commission's stance on network
management is much less articulated. Network neutrality is regarded as
mainly a U.S. problem," 7 and it is argued that the market in general is
sufficiently competitive to solve unreasonable network management so that
consumers who are unhappy with the discriminatory practices of their
Internet Service Provider (ISP) can easily switch to an ISP that does not
discriminate. 1 8 In cases of unacceptable degradation of services and the
blocking of lawful content, antitrust law and the regulatory framework are
held to be appropriate remedies.' 9 This is supplemented with consumer-
protection measures, which impose transparency on network operators to
disclose their network-management policies.
20
The European Parliament has been more active on network neutrality
since reviewing the European Commission's proposals, and has moved
toward increased regulation that bans access restrictions on end users.'
12
115. Id., at 40: "Maintaining the current regulatory framework (Option 3) provides
continuity and the opportunity to build on existing achievements."; id at 47:
The Commission therefore considers that a modified Option 3 is the most
appropriate option. The modification would be to add mandatory functional
separation ... as an exceptional measure available in the NRA's regulatory
toolbox." Id
116. Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 28-47. Functional separation is a lighter version
of structural separation in which the incumbent's next-generation network is turned into an
operationally separate entity, yet acts under the ownership of the parent company. Id. at 29.
117. See Commission Staff Working Document on the Review of the EU Regulatory
Framework for Electronic Comm. Networks and Servs., PARL. EUR. Doc. (SEC 2006) 816
(2006) at 26.
118. See Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 91.
119. Id.; cf Wong & Garrie, supra note 5, at 325-331 (providing a detailed account of
how the 2002 European framework would deal with network neutrality concerns).
120. Network operators are required to inform their customers of any access limitations
in advance of the conclusion of a contract and regularly thereafter. This measure of
transparency should encourage users to switch ISPs when they are unsatisfied with any
(lawful) discriminatory activities. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Serv. and Users" Rights
Relating to Electronic Comm. Networks, COM (2007) 699 final (Nov. 13, 2007); Impact
Assessment, supra note 3, at 95-96.
121. This came to the forefront most clearly in the by-now infamous amendment 138,
stating that
no restriction may be imposed on the fundamental rights and freedoms of end-
users, without a prior ruling by the judicial authorities, notably in accordance with
Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on
freedom of expression and information, save when public security is threatened in
which case the ruling may be subsequent.
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This has caused a dispute between the European Parliament and the
Council of Ministers, the latter of which strongly opposed the proposed
regulatory measures and deleted such amendments in its own amendments
to the bill. 122 Because the European Parliament subsequently reintroduced
its network neutrality amendment in its second reading of the bill, 23 both
institutions were forced into a conciliation procedure, postponing adoption
of a new regulatory framework for telecoms until an agreement is
reached.
124
The contours of the definitive new regulatory framework seem to be
agreed upon while an agreement is all but finalized.125 Concerning network
neutrality, the legislative procedure of the framework evidenced a cautious
approach by the European institutions. Communication by the European
Council and the European Commission suggests that European
policymakers are uncertain whether network neutrality is or will become an
issue on the European market, or whether it is not (yet) enough of an issue
to put the SMP-centered regulatory approach under discussion in
telecoms. 126 Thus, network neutrality is dealt with in terms of the existing
procedure of the regulatory framework, in which regulatory action is taken
only in cases of SMP. European regulators have chosen to take this wait-
and-see approach, apparently arguing that, for now, antitrust law and the
regulatory framework are sufficiently robust to deal with future network
neutrality issues.
A practical result of the upcoming revised version of the European
regulatory framework for telecommunications is that, through the bickering
between the European Commission and Parliament on one side and the
Council of Ministers on the other, little effort has been put into
harmonizing network management for the internal market. As such,
(internal quotations omitted). PARL. EuR. Doc. A6-0321/138 (2008). This amendment is
striking since it takes network neutrality out of the European Commission's strict economic
context and into European Fundamental Rights such as Freedom of Expression. Id.
122. See Council Common Position, supra note 107; Directive 2002/21/EC, OJ L 108
(24.4 2002).
123. See PARL. EuR. Doc. A6-0272, supra note 108, at 28; Press Release, European
Parliament, No Agreement on Reform of Telecom Legislation (May 6, 2009), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20090505IPR55085/200905051P
R55085_en.pdf.
124. See Presidency Press Statement on the State of Play Regarding the 'Telecoms
Package,' Council of the European Union (June 11, 2009), available at
http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/presidency-press-statement-on-the-
state-of-play-regarding-the-_telecoms-package_-25123/.
125. See supra note 109.
126. See Wong & Garrie, supra note 5, at 332 ("The prevailing view is that the existing
European legislative framework is sufficient to deal with conflicts arising between network
and cable providers and therefore, does not necessitate the types of regulations anticipated in
the United States.").
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network neutrality will be approached as a matter of consumer
protection. 127
The European framework offers a rich suite of tools for regulatory
intervention on telecom markets that are not sufficiently competitive. 28
While these measures are all adequate methods to discipline network
operators who violate network neutrality principles as an abuse of market
dominance, 129 it is unlikely that they will be implemented in a uniform
manner throughout the continent. Different national implementations of
pan-European policy are inevitable with the nature of a directive as a
legislative instrument 130 and the way European governance is generally
organized. However, the emerging, next-generation broadband market is
likely to reveal such stark differences in (de)regulatory approaches between
various member states and that the internal market may be jeopardized,' 3'
which is the ultimate goal of European telecommunications policy. 132
In sum, there are some relevant points of critique that can be brought
against the new European regulatory framework and the way it deals with
network neutrality issues. The compromise bill that will emerge from the
conciliation committee, as with many European compromises, is likely to
illustrate the conflicts between the federalist (Commission) and
sovereignist (Council) branches in EU governance, with an activist
Parliament in between. 133 The proposed legislation takes a wait-and-see
approach to network neutrality and network management, in contrast to the
active role European institutions have played in discussing broadband
deployment. Network management is not dealt with in much detail, which
suggests that the European Commission is afraid to take bold steps to
127. PARL. EUR. Doc. A6-0321/138, supra note 121.
128. Examples of these tools include imposed transparency, nondiscrimination, open
access and local loop unbundling, price control, and structural separation. See Access
Directive, supra note 85.
129. But see Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 12, at 416-420 (providing an
exposd on the theoretical possibility of network neutrality violation outside of market
dominance).
130. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
1, 278 ("A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods."); cf CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 104, at 279 ("Sometimes the provisions
of a directive represent a compromise between Member States on a complex or sensitive
matter and in respect of which certain discretionary options are left open to States.").
131. See Chirico et al., supra note 110, at 49 (analyzing how particular access tiering on
broadband infrastructure is likely to fragment the European internal broadband market).
132. See Commission Directive 88/301, art. 90, 1988 0. J. (L 131) 73-77 (EEC).
133. See generally NEIL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION (MacMillan 1995) (1989) AND IAN BACHE & STEPHEN GEORGE, PoLIrICS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Oxford UP, 2006) for an overview of the relation between the European
Institutions and their federalist/sovereignist leanings.
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influence markets with a coordinated network neutrality policy. This rigid
wait-and-see stance may not be the preferred approach for dealing with
network management of next-generation broadband as an emerging market.
IV. TOWARDS DYNAMIC BROADBAND POLICY
This Section will critically evaluate recent policy that concerns
network neutrality in Europe and the United States. Preceding sections
have discussed recent developments in U.S. broadband and network
management policy, which have developed following successive
categorical approaches that have been subject to a high degree of
institutional learning. European broadband policy turns out to be more
systematic and analytical, in which regulatory intervention is only triggered
in cases of market failure. On an anecdotal level, in broadband deployment,
this European policy has been quite successful compared to the U.S.
approach. This is reflected in the latest OECD figures on broadband
deployment,1 34 in which the United States ranks fifteenth out of twenty-
nine countries in broadband penetration, performing worse than nine EU
countries.
OECD Broadband Subscribers Per One-Hundred Inhabitants by
Technology, December 2008
35------ -- --- ir/A
20 ................
25
/
Souce: OEQD
This graph also shows that new EU member states, such as the Czech and
Slovak republics, have an equally large or larger percentage of fiber/LAN
(next-generation) broadband connections than the United States' 35
This Article will test, by means of theoretical modeling, the
assumption that European policy has encouraged broadband penetration. A
134. OECD Broadband Portal, Broadband Penetration, Historical Time Series Dec.
2008, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband/ (Access main portal and
download at chart lm.); see also Communication from the Commission on Preparing
Europe's Digital Future i2010 Mid-Term Review, at 4, COM (2008) 199 final (Apr. 17,
2008).
135. OECD Broadband Portal, Percentage of Fibre Connections in Total Broadband
Among Countries Reporting Fibre Subscribers Dec. 2008, http://www.oecd.org/stiict/
broadband/ (Access main portal and download at chart 11.).
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venture into antitrust theory will analyze how European and U.S. network
neutrality policies relate to regulatory errors, which have significant effects
on market development. It has been established that, in emerging markets,
such as broadband, errors are not only more likely to occur, but will also
have graver consequences than in established markets. 36 Thus, testing how
EU and U.S. network-management policies relates to regulatory errors is a
good indicator of how effective these policies are in achieving the
potentially conflicting goal of increased competitive, nondiscriminatory
broadband deployment.
The outline of this final Section will be as follows: First, this Section
begins by examining antitrust theory and defining the characteristics and
costs of regulatory errors. Second, these issues will then be related to
broadband as a specific type of emerging market, which requires a flexible
regulatory apparatus that is able to pivot between dealing with specific
errors, instead of categorically focusing policy on one error specifically.
Even though European policymakers are dealing with network neutrality in
a way that does not fit with broadband as a specific emerging market, the
overall contours of European telecoms regulation is better equipped to deal
with regulatory errors than U.S. policy. However, obligated to draft a
national broadband plan under the Recovery Act, 137 the FCC has the
opportunity to develop a dynamic and flexible mechanism for network
management similar to the European framework, but better.
A. Antitrust Under False Positives and False Negatives
More than other legal disciplines, (U.S.) antitrust scholarship has
developed a tradition of identifying and evading two common errors: false
positives (Fp) and false negatives (F,). These two errors originate in the
statistical sciences, where they are commonly labeled as "type one" (Fp)
and "type two" (F) errors.' 38 A type-one error designates a false null
hypothesis that is mistakenly labeled true; whereas, a type-two error is a
true null hypothesis that is mistakenly labeled false. 39 Following the same
mechanism, and as demonstrated in Table 1, a false positive emerges when
restrictive antitrust is imposed on a competitive market, thus offering a
solution to a problem that does not (yet) exist. A false negative, on the
136. See Crocioni, supra note 7.
137. See Recovery Act § 6001(k)(1)-(2).
138. Some studies in law and economics also use the type one/type two terminologies.
The present Article however will refer to the two errors as false positives and false
negatives.
139. See, e.g., R.S. Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two
Errors and the Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 843 (1988) (implementing the statistical
distinction between type one and type two errors in legal scholarship).
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
contrary, emerges when antitrust law that is too lenient is imposed on a
market that is not sufficiently competitive.
140
Table 1: False Positives and False Negatives in Antitrust Law
False False
positive (F) Correct (C) Correct (C) negative (F,)
Restrictive Lenient Restrictive Lenient
antitrust antitrust antitrust antitrust
Competitive -'Competitive
Market M.
This distinction suggests that a safely competitive market requires
little enforcement of antitrust law and, that when markets do not function
properly, strong antitrust policy is needed to correct market failure. In the
statistical sciences, type-one and type-two errors operate on a continuum-
by decreasing the chance for type-one errors, the chance of type-two errors
increases and vice versa. Moreover, type-one errors generally are
considered to be the greater evil. 141 In law, both the "weight" of the errors
and their inverse relation has been subject to more debate, which has been
particularly prominent in antitrust scholarship. 142
A traditional analysis of false positives and false negatives in antitrust
law would conclude that social costs involved with the former are much
higher than the latter. 43 In the case of a false positive, regulation will add a
cost to otherwise efficiently functioning markets, while there also will be
costs involved in turning back these "bad laws." Conversely, the costs of
140. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1411-18.
141. Type-one errors are overtly gullible; whereas, type-two errors are overtly skeptical.
In science, the latter is naturally preferred over the former. See Radford, supra note 139, at
851.
142. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1412.
143. Id. at 1412-13.
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false negatives are considered low. For example, a false negative arises
when a retail DSL reseller is subjected to a price squeeze by the wholesale
operator upstream, 144 which has been determined judicially to fall outside
the scope of antitrust law. 145 If no additional remedies are imposed here,
there will be a cost to society. However, under the traditional rationale, this
cost will eventually be mitigated through market entry by competitors,
which will, in turn, drive down the retail price. Thus, the market will
alternatively self-correct without intervention (and cost). Note that this
rationale only works if there are no entry barriers to the market. Thus, in
order to prevent a false-positive error, it would be best to focus on
eliminating entry barriers. Sticking with the same example, if the wholesale
DSL operator controls an essential facility, and there is not sufficient
intermodal competition from cable or wireless broadband, the market will
not be able to self-correct. 46 There are high entry barriers here, which need
to be neutralized.
144. A price squeeze can emerge when the wholesale firm is vertically integrated into
the retail sector, while other retailers rely on the wholesaler to supply the goods they sell
themselves. The wholesale operator can squeeze these competing resellers out of the market
by simultaneously raising wholesale prices for the resellers while dropping its own retail
prices to customers. See Dennis L. Weisman, Access Pricing and Exclusionary Behavior, 72
ECON. LETTERS 121, 121-22 (2001); but see J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price Squeeze
as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. COMPETION L. & ECON. 279 (2008) (providing a
critical view of the role of price squeeze in antitrust law).
145. This example is analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court's February 25, 2009, ruling in
Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comm., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009); see also Brief of
Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Linkline Comm., Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-512)
(academic discussion of Linkline while still at intermediate level).
146. A similar reasoning was developed by the European Court of Justice in its ruling in
Case C-202-07, France Tildcom v. Comm'n, at para. 112 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/:
[T]he lack of any possibility of recoupment of losses is not sufficient to prevent
the undertaking concerned reinforcing its dominant position, in particular,
following the withdrawal from the market of one or a number of its competitors,
so that the degree of competition existing on the market, already weakened
precisely because of the presence of the undertaking concerned, is further reduced
and customers suffer loss as a result of the limitation of the choices available to
them.
Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to compare this judgment with the Supreme Court's
Linkline case. See 129 S.Ct. 1109.
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This analysis is grounded in Chicago School law and economics, 147
and was prominent in scholarship, policymaking, and judicial lawmaking
between the 1970s and the early 2000s. Chicago School theorists strongly
spoke out against false positives while arguing for a permissive approach to
false negatives. After all, under the Chicago School rationale, false
negatives would self-correct eventually, while false positives only could be
the result of unnecessary intervention in markets. 48 The Chicago School's
bias against false positives in antitrust culminated in the question of
whether there should be antitrust laws to begin with, 149 and has lead to a
cautious interpretation of antitrust law by courts. In telecommunications-
related cases, this was most clearly demonstrated in Trinko, where the
Supreme Court was permissive of false-negative errors, and stressed
evading false positives as a main motivation for its decision.
50
The Chicago School's dominance in antitrust scholarship has been
under attack since the early 2000s, mainly due to criticism of Chicago's
tolerant approach to false negatives. 151 This new current of antitrust
147. For an eloquent expression of the Chicago rationale regarding false positives and
false negatives, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1984):
Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry. True, this
long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim. The
central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run. But this
should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-
correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.
Id.
148. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1413-14.
149. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and
Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1994); Easterbrook, supra note 147;
compare Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer
Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2003, with Jonathan B.
Baker, The Casefor Antitrust Enforcement, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2003. See generally
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S.
McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995).
150. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) ("The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2
[Communications Act] liability."); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) ("Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one
are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to
protect.").
151. See Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust
Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 303 (2004); Joseph
P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust
Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437 (2001); Peter C. Carstensen, False Positives in
Identifying Liability for Exclusionary Conduct: Conceptual Error, Business Reality, and
Aspen, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 295 (2008); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law
and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R.
Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008).
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scholars argues, in essence, against categorical antitrust rulings, and
attempts to debunk the danger of false positives while pointing attention to
the danger of false negatives. 152 Not only are false positives less prevalent
than suggested by Chicago School scholars, but, in the end, the social costs
of false negatives might be higher than false positives. 15 3
The Chicago School's studies rightly point out that economic
determinism is present in traditional antitrust doctrines. However, in the
absence of empirical proof, the Chicago School's scholars' claims are
incomplete, and will need to be supplemented by extensive empirical
research. For a start, nonetheless, it is a worthwhile exercise to identify
three basic premises underlying Chicago's assumptions on false positives
and false negatives in antitrust: (1) courts very often commit false-positive
errors in antitrust litigation; (2) false positives in antitrust law have a
detrimental effect on efficient market behavior; and (3) unregulated
markets are efficient. 154 Criticizing these premises as overtly categorical is
valid and persuasive on an anecdotal level. 155 Moreover, drawing attention
to the danger of allowing too many false negatives in antitrust is
pertinent.
156
However, in order to develop an effective rebuttal to the antitrust
regime, which fights false positives at the risk of false negatives, it is
necessary to criticize the Chicago School on its own strong suit-
grounding legal conclusions in economic analysis. In general, there seems
to be a desire to update Chicago's assumptions on antitrust law, but the
new wave of U.S. post-Chicago antitrust scholars seems to be ill-equipped
to meet this demand. Interestingly, while the ratio between false positives
and false negatives seems to be of little interest to European regulators and
antitrust scholars, 5 7 the most constructive work in law and economics on
balancing the two errors beyond the Chicago School's approach may
actually be European.
152. This new wave of antitrust study was joined by the great Alfred Kahn, who referred
to Justice Scalia's reasoning on the costs of false positive errors to categorically exceed false
negatives in Matsushita as a "bromide that fails to differentiate between the initiation of
price competition from the response that punishes and suppresses it and restores the status
quo ante." Alfred E. Kahn, Telecommunications: The Transition from Regulation to
Antitrust, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 159, 172 (2006) (emphasis added).
153. False negative errors may lead to overlooked dynamic efficiency problems, as
competitors are in fact disincentitivized to enter the market Cf Dogan & Lemley, supra note
151, at 703.
154. See Carstensen, supra note 151, at 309-21.
155. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 151, at 1260.
156. See Carstensen, supra note 151, at 321.
157. See, e.g., Renato Nazzini, The Microsoft Case and the Future of Article 82,
ANTITRUST, Spring 2008, at 59, 63 ("In the EU, the European Commission and the
Community Courts have rarely, if ever, engaged in a discussion of the risk of false positives
or false negatives as a factor shaping enforcement policy or legal rules.").
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Indeed, Pietro Crocioni's elaborate study concerns mitigating the
abuse of dominance in emerging markets, which are particularly prone to
false-positive and false-negative errors. Because of the general uncertainty
that characterizes next-generation broadband as an emerging market, not
only is there a greater risk for false-negative and false-positive errors to
occur, but also the consequences of these errors in terms of market
foreclosure are much greater.158 It is worthwhile, therefore, to arrive at
more precise taxonomy of the risks and costs associated with the two types
of errors in the different kinds of emerging markets, allowing for more
tailored network-management policymaking in emerging markets such as
broadband. This approach, moreover, bridges false positives and false
negatives in antitrust with similar regulatory errors.
A key contribution of Crocioni's study lies in its critique of the
seamless offsetting of false-negative and false-positive costs in the first
place. Through theoretical modeling, the author demonstrates that-at least
in a static setting-both costs are of an altogether different nature and, thus,
cannot be offset as effortlessly as often assumed. 59 False-negative costs
concern a deadweight loss of added price above marginal costs that are
easily quantifiable; 160 whereas, false-positive errors lead to hypothetic loss
in innovation, which is more difficult to quantify precisely. 161 Whereas
false-negative costs are mainly backward looking, measuring the costs of
false positives is a forward-looking exercise. This calls into question any
categorical assumption about the compared costs of both types of errors
and, specifically, criticizes the Chicago School's premise of false-positive
costs to be substantially higher than false-negative costs under all
circumstances. 1
62
158. See Crocioni, supra note 7, at 451.
159. The models assume a wholesale essential facility monopolist, who caters to a
competitive retail market downstream, in which it is also vertically integrated-as is often
the case in telecoms. See id. at 453. Note that the models do not account for intermodal
competition between adjacent wholesale operators of different infrastructures. For a detailed
study on offsetting intermodal and intramodal competition in telecommunications and
broadband, see Spulber & Yoo, supra note 26, at 152-86.
160. In this model, the absence of antitrust intervention in a noncompetitive market leads
to rent-seeking behavior by the wholesale monopolist. Consequently, an increase in price
and decrease in quantity lead to a quantifiable deadweight cost even further above marginal
cost. See Crocioni, supra note 7, at 503-04.
161. In case of unjustified antitrust, the monopolist is disincentivized to improve his or
her service, which leads to a loss of improvement that would be valued by consumers. The
upward movement of the linear demand curve, which is supposed to occur under normal
circumstances, does not take place; this implies a welfare loss. See id. at 504-05.
162. Crocioni's critique is supported by more extensive modeling conducted by LEAR,
which concludes that
[i]t is true that market power may not last forever and that entry of new firms or
technological change may drastically challenge even a well-established dominant
position. However, there is no clear-cut explanation of why bad rules take longer
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Rather, these results suggest that, instead of categorical policy, a more
precise weighing of false-negative and false-positive costs, based on the
particulars of an (emerging) market, is in place. This is valid in both
antitrust and regulatory settings. An emerging market, in which detrimental
network effects are more problematic than a dependence on innovation and
investment,163 suggests an approach in which false-negative errors are
evaded at the risk of false-positive errors.164 After all, restrictive policy will
be more effective in guarding against the welfare loss of a noncompetitive
market. Conversely, when a market is highly dependent on investment for
dynamic efficiency and less prone to negative network effects,165 an
approach in which false positives are avoided at the cost of false negatives
is needed. 66 In order to prevent foreclosure of innovative markets
involving significant fixed costs, regulators might grant more leeway to
monopolists in order to safeguard innovation in the long run. In an
emerging market only characterized by above-average uncertainty' 67 -
often the case in very new markets-it is advised that antitrust authorities
take a wait-and-see approach until it can be determined whether
enforcement should focus on a specific type of error.168 The most complex
situation arises when all three features apply: (1) above-average
uncertainty, (2) dependence on innovation and investment, and (3) strong
network effects.1 69 In this case, "middle ground remedies" are preferred,
which
cater to some extent for possible competition concerns but not to the
fullest extent, allowing some incentives for [the monopolist] to
innovate and invest. An example could be imposing as a remedy an
obligation to supply without requiring that [the essential facility] is
supplied at cost. However, this approach could be more suited to a
regulatory type of intervention than under competition law. 70
to be reversed than the time required by markets to correct the anticompetitive
effects of abusive conducts, nor has any empirical evidence so far been brought
forward to sustain this conjecture.
PAOLO BucciRossi, GiANCARLo SPAGNOLO & CRISTIANA VITALE, LABORATORIO DI
ECONOMIA, ANTITRUST, REGOLAMENTAZIONE (LEAR), The Cost of Inappropriate
Interventions/Non Interventions Under Article 82, at § 6.38 (2006) (providing an economic
discussion paper prepared for the United Kingdom's Office of Fair Trading). For the
modeling affirming this statement, see annexes C, D, and E for nonspillover assumptions,
spillover assumptions, and their effect on ancillary markets, respectively. Id. at annexes C-
E.
163. Crocioni, supra note 7, at 498.
164. Id. at 510.
165. Id. at 498.
166. Id. at511.
167. Id. at 498.
168. Id. at 507.
169. Id. at498.
170. Id. at 512.
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Thus, the most complex emerging markets call for a flexible
regulatory mechanism, supplemental to antitrust law, which is able to pivot
between fighting false-negative and false-positive errors, depending on
which type of error carries the largest cost in a specific situation. This
suggests that broadband, as a complex emerging market,' 7' is in need of a
dynamic interplay between evading false-positive and false-negative costs,
as both have a clear effect on the market, but not necessarily at the same
time and to the same extent under all scenarios. In order to minimize social
costs, as previously suggested, a regulatory mechanism should provide
flexibility, allowing lenient or restrictive intervention in the broadband
market depending on whether the danger of a specific type of error is more
apparent in a given situation.
The following and final section argues that the theoretical premises
underlying the European framework for telecommunications have the
potential to function according to this flexible principle, yet fail to do so in
network neutrality policy. By contrast, recent U.S. policy has switched
between categorical approaches to deregulating and re-regulating
broadband, which may lead to regulatory uncertainty. Therefore, this
Article recommends that U.S. lawmakers implement a flexible and
dynamic regulatory mechanism of network management for its domestic
broadband market.
B. Network Management Under False Positives and False
Negatives
The broadband market is too complex and uncertain to benefit from a
categorical approach to (de)regulation. Rather, any intervention should be
flexible and adaptive to specific circumstances. Because broadband, as an
emerging market, is subject to above-average uncertainty, prone to network
effects, and dependent on investment, but not necessarily to the same
extent at all times, antitrust law and regulation should be applied flexibly
and on a case-by-case basis. 172 This does not, of course, rule out the
possibility of erroneous intervention or erroneous restraint, but at least
offers a mechanism that attempts to strike a balance between avoiding
false-negative and false-positive errors in a transparent manner that benefits
firms, consumers, and regulators.
171. As previously defined, next generation broadband is subject to above-average
uncertainty, highly dependent on investment and innovation, and prone to network effects.
See supra notes 32-35.
172. The appropriateness of a case-by-case approach in dealing with network neutrality
issued is echoed in the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which is a promising sign.
See Preserving the Open Internet and Broadband Industry Practices supra note 40, at § 134.
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European telecommunications law has the potential to function
according to this principle. However, with network neutrality, European
policy does not live up to this potential. As will be demonstrated herein, the
European wait-and-see stance on network neutrality advances an incorrect
definition of broadband as an emerging market, which is not congruent
with the overall European policy in next-generation broadband deployment.
By expanding Table 1 into Table 2, this Article illustrates how the
European regulatory framework works in regulating next-generation
broadband deployment.
As long as the market is competitive, only antitrust law applies.
173
This is the default position in EU telecommunications policy (C). Under
this scenario, there is supposed to be effective competition between
broadband operators, and no reported abuse of vertical dominance on
specific infrastructures. If, through a review process by member states'
NRAs, competition authorities, or by the European Commission's own
research, there turns out to be a market failure or abuse of dominance,
174
the possibility of a false negative arises (F,). This situation could occur if
an operator of next-generation broadband networks is not penalized for
abusive conduct under antitrust law because a national regulatory or
competition authority fears impeding investment by making false-positive
errors. 75 In this case, the regulatory framework with sector-specific
measures, which is supposed to correct the market failure at hand and deal
with detrimental network effects, when needed, can be put into motion.
176
This naturally leads to situation (C2)-justified intervention in case the
particular broadband market is not sufficiently competitive.' 7 Note that the
trap of false positives (Fp) logically does not apply in this model. After all,
it is inherent to the European mechanism that no sector-specific regulation
is imposed if the market is deemed to be sufficiently competitive, and all
173. See Framework Directive Recital 27, supra note 85.
174. With the aid of the Commission Recommendation on telecommunications markets
subject to ex ante regulation, see, 2003, O.J. (L 114) 45 supra note 91, at 45-47.
175. For instance, this was the case in Germany. To stimulate former incumbent
Deutsche Telekom to roll out the VDSL infiastructure in 2006, the German government had
planned to impose minimal regulation on incumbent Deutsche Telekom, effectively
abandoning nondiscrimination. This prompted a dispute between the German government
and the European Commission. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Comm'n Launches "Fast
Track" Infringement Proceedings Against Germany for "Regulatory Holidays" for Deutsche
Telekom (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/07/237&format=-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also
Pierre Larouche, Europe and Investment in Infrastructure with Emphasis on Electronic
Communications (TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP 2007-031, 2007).
176. See Access Directive, supra note 85.
177. In case of the Deutsche Telekom example, supra note 175, functional separation of
the incumbent VDSL company would be a possible option. See supra note 116 for a
discussion on functional separation.
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regulatory intervention is lifted once markets develop sustainable
competition. By effect, the error with the greatest cost in terms of
innovation and investment (Fp) is avoided, while the mechanism of the
framework works such that problematic externalities are targeted by sector-
specific regulation.
Table 2: False-Positive and False-Negative Errors in the
European Framework for Telecommunications
False False
positive (F) Correct (C,) Correct (C) negative (F)
Regulatory Antitrust Regulatory Antitrust
intervention enforcement intervention enforcement
Competitive -' Competitive
Market M.
This scheme highlights the efficiency of the European regulatory
framework for telecommunications, and the potential promise this
mechanism shows in regulating next-generation broadband. As previously
demonstrated, broadband is a particular emerging market that is generally
subject to above-average uncertainty and equally characterized by a
dependence on investment and a vulnerability to externalities, such as
network effects.'78 These market characteristics suggest a vulnerability to
false-negative and false-positive errors, 179 both of which have negative
consequences on the further development of next-generation broadband.
European institutions more or less follow this rationale in developing
policy to stimulate next-generation broadband deployment. It is recognized
that, while network operators should be given at least some leeway to
178. See Crocioni, supra note 7.
179. Id.
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recoup their investments in next-generation infrastructure, and avoid false-
positive errors for this reason. Nonetheless, the available regulatory tools
are expanded with functional separation of incumbents' "regular" and
"next-generation" operations in case the costs of false-negative errors
exceed the costs of false-positive errors.
80
However, European institutions have failed to follow the same
rationale when formulating policy on network neutrality. Besides increased
consumer protection laws,'18 lawmakers seem inclined to avoid developing
explicit network neutrality policy and unsure as to the extent that network
neutrality will be an issue in the European market. 82 This supports a
general wait-and-see approach to network neutrality. Because this issue has
yet to develop, any regulatory intervention would be premature. 183 When
following the aforementioned definition of emerging markets, this wait-
and-see approach suggests an understanding of broadband as an emerging
market subject to above-average uncertainty only.184 This is the case in
very new emerging markets, which indeed justifies a very prudent approach
to intervention.18 5 However, the wait-and-see stance to network neutrality
does not square with the general European approach to developing next-
generation infrastructure, in which it is-rightly-recognized that
broadband is subject to above-average uncertainty, prone to network
effects, and is highly dependent on investment. 86 This state of the market
requires a dynamic approach to offset investment dependence and negative
externalities by flexible regulation, which clearly is not what the European
institutions plan to do with network neutrality.
Therefore, it can be concluded that, while the European regulatory
framework has a latent potential to address network neutrality in the
systematic and flexible manner that is required, it fails to transform this
potential into actual policy. Returning to the state of affairs in the United
States, a different situation arises. With Brand X came a deregulatory
approach to broadband markets, which, through Comcast, the BTOP of the
180. Cf Impact Assessment, supra note 3, at 27-29.
181. Id. at 95-96.
182. See Review of EU Regulatory Framework, supra note 100, at 32.
183. This was echoed by an open letter from prominent European academics. See Martin
E. Cave, et. al., Statement by European Academics on the Inappropriateness of Imposing
Increased Internet Regulation in the EU (Jan. 8, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1329926; cf Wong & Garrie, supra note 5, at 339 ("the existing
regulations under... the Access and Interconnection Directive means that that scenario of
access tiering between network operators and application providers may appear remote.").
184. See Crocioni, supra note 7.
185. Id. at 507.
186. See supra note 120. See also Pierre Larouche, Europe and Investment in
Infrastructure with Emphasis on Electronic Communications, TILEC Discussion Paper, DP
2007-31 (2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1020899.
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Recovery Act, and the FCC's Proposed Rulemaking, is under debate again.
When analyzing these shifts in policy alongside the framework of false
positives and false negatives, it turns out that the broadband regulatory
practices of the previous administration focused mainly on false-positive
traps, at the cost of increasing the likelihood of false negatives. This is also
the strategy employed by the Supreme Court in Trinko
187 and Brand X. 8
Common carriage regulation was deemed to hold back otherwise
competitive markets, with great costs involved. This resulted in a stronger
reliance on antitrust law, as both DSL and cable would fall outside the
scope of sector-specific Title II regulation.
18 9
Commentators argue that this method decreases false-positive errors,
while also acknowledging that such a strategy typically works on a trial-
and-error basis with a high degree in institutional learning.' 90 Moreover, the
deregulatory approach directly after Brand X supposes a market structure
of workable competition.' 9' After all, theoretically, only in a competitive
setting will committed false-negative errors be self-corrected by the
market.' 92 Academics have since voiced compelling critique against this
Chicago School rationale,' 93 which has been validated by actual modeling
efforts. 19 4 It turns out that any categorical approach to (de)regulating
broadband markets is ill advised. Rather, in an emerging, uncertain, and
complex market, such as broadband, a flexible policy that pivots between
focusing on false positives and false negatives is likely to be most
successful. However, through the Comcast case
195 and the Recovery Act, 196
a theme has developed in which regulatory oversight is increased-
constituting a more categorical focus on tackling false-negative errors.
Under the given circumstances, it is unclear whether, for next-generation
broadband, these regulatory initiatives would constitute a false positive (Fp)
or a correct intervention to market failure (C2); again, the only way to find
187. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398,
415 (2004)
188. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
189. See 47 U.S.C § 253 (2007).
190. See Bauer & Bohlin, supra note 76, at 50.
191. See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 48. See Also Bauer & Brolin, id, at 49:
"Although it was not explicitly invoked in policy debates, the US approach toward NGN
follows the logic of this method. When the new regime was put into place, the anticipated
future market structure was one of workable competition." Id.
192. See McChesney, supra note 10, at 1412-13.
193. For an overview of this critical scholarship, see supra note 147.
194. See Buccirossi, Spagnolo & Vitale, supra note 162; see also Crocioni, supra note 7.
195. See Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra
note 1.
196. See Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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out is through trial and error. Moreover, it could be argued that, particularly
in the Recovery Act, there is a higher risk of a false-positive trap because
the proposed ex ante measures apply on a very broad basis. 97
What may be emerging is a pattern by which old categorical
approaches are replaced by new ones. Indeed, it has been stated that the
FCC has a long-standing tradition in categorical rulemaking, 98 and has
developed a habit in which disputes are mitigated on a "legislative-like
basis, with a limited track record in handling adjudications and expedited
proceedings under a rule-of-law model."' 199
Thus, instead of categorical policy depending on trial and error, U.S.
regulators need a more analytical mechanism to monitor broadband
markets, analogous to the European system previously described. The main
modification of recent policy would be a larger role for the FCC in
administering competition in broadband markets. The U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly voiced its discomfort with administering competition in
telecommunications through judicial lawmaking in antitrust.200 Rather, the
role of monitoring the competitiveness in U.S. broadband markets should
be entrusted to the FCC, similar to the role played by the Directorates
General for Competition and Information Society in the European
Commission. Indeed, the idea of charging the FCC with increased antitrust
oversight over the broadband market is not new and has been argued
convincingly by others.20 1 This Article has attempted to strengthen this
argument by outlining the analytical grounds under which an agency like
197. For a compelling argument against blanket ex-ante rules in network management
issues, see Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, supra note 12.
198. See Weiser, supra note 12, at 311.
199. Id. at 318.
200. See, e.g., Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398, 415 (2004) (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of
Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1990): "No court should impose a duty to
deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be
deemed irremedia[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to
assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency."); accord Pacific Bell
Tel. Co. v. Linidine Comm., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009):
It is difficult enough for courts to identify and remedy an alleged anticompetitive
practice at one level, such as predatory pricing in retail markets or a violation of
the duty-to-deal doctrine at the wholesale level .... And courts would be aiming
at a moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices that may
result in a squeeze.
Id. at 1121 (emphasis in original).
201. See, e.g., Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 12, at 2; Kahn, supra note 152; Joseph
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence Of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARv. J. L. &
TECH. 85 (2003); cf Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute:
An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 19, 21 (2009) (arguing for network neutrality rulemaking to be administered by the
Department of Justice and FTC).
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the FCC could implement a comprehensive strategy in network
management and broadband deployment.
Interestingly, the Recovery Act endorses such a role for the FCC.
After all, as specified in the Act, the FCC is obligated to draft a National
Broadband Plan.2 °2 In this plan, the FCC could draft an analytical model in
which procedures for market monitoring are delineated and specifies a
string of tools for regulatory intervention in case market failure is detected
in these developing broadband infrastructures. Like the European
regulatory framework, such a mechanism would allow for correction in
case of a false-negative error, while evading the false-positive trap
altogether. Sector-specific intervention would only be applied in case of
demonstrated market failure. Similarly, as in the EU, any regulatory
measure should be evaluated on a continuous basis, and be lifted as soon as
robust competition allows.203
This approach has the benefit of being flexible and analytical at the
same time-allowing for a tailored approach in network neutrality issues
that is also transparent and straightforward. Such a mechanism would pivot
between generic antitrust law and regulatory intervention based on
necessity. The "pivoting player" would be the FCC. Network neutrality is a
topic too delicate to fall under antitrust law or sector-specific provisions per
se. At the same time, there is a great benefit to precedent-setting through
transparent and systematic policy at the FCC. The outlined European
approach to antitrust-triggered regulation for broadband offers exactly that,
and would offer the promise to rule out regulatory errors that have plagued
U.S. telecommunications policy for ages.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, a comparative analysis has been developed between
European and U.S. policy in next-generation broadband and network
management. After a brief description of current problematic issues of
network neutrality and the characteristics of broadband as a complex
emerging market, a critical summary of the most recent events in U.S.
policymaking was present. Furthermore, European telecommunications
policy has been addressed at length. This analysis was meant to evaluate
the process towards the regulatory framework of 2002 and its current
revision, which was designed as a mechanism in which antitrust law and
sector-specific regulation interact. The effectiveness of this mechanism can
be demonstrated both empirically and theoretically in terms of next-
generation broadband deployment. However, the European institutions
have failed to recognize the potential of their own regulatory framework in
202. Recovery Act § 6001(k)(2).
203. See 2003 O.J. (L 114) 45, supra note 91.
[Vol. 62
Number 1] INTRODUCING A EUROPEANAPPROACH 117
dealing with network neutrality. In a complex and emerging market, such
as broadband, only a dynamic and flexible regulatory mechanism will
minimize regulatory errors. Therefore, U.S. policymakers, and,
particularly, the FCC, should pay close attention to developments in
Europe. While there are, indeed, notable problems in European broadband
policy, the European approach may offer the necessary regulatory tools to
boost the United States' digital future. The FCC and the Obama
Administration are strongly advised to develop a National Broadband Plan
according to European precedent that embraces workable competition, so
that a reliable and neutral broadband Internet can reach as many Americans
as possible.
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